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ABSTRACT 
The author analyses the success rate and efficiency of Slovenian public sector 
companies in the course of their operations and looks into opportunities for savings and 
ways of attracting private investment in infrastructure. By reducing expenditures public 
companies achieve higher profits, from which the state in turn receives firstly, divi-
dends as a form of budgetary revenue; and secondly, increased tax revenues, as public 
companies are not exempt from paying corporate income tax. By increasing the rate of 
return in public companies, the state therefore receives a larger slice of the budget pie 
on account of its two roles – as both owner and administrator, and as fiscal generator 
and provider. The author concludes that Slovenian companies cannot achieve identified 
possible savings without the efficient management of public sector companies. To this 
end  at least two reforms should be introduced in Slovenia: firstly, the introduction of a 
system of contracts between the state and public sector companies on the meeting of 
specific pre-determined goals; and secondly, the establishment of a politically indepen-
dent system of recruitment and appointment of managers based on professional refe-
rences, and a management remuneration system tied to either the operating results 
achieved by said public companies or on the meeting of certain pre-determined goals 
set out in contracts between the state and public companies. 
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1.  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse, based on literature review, how effec-
tive and efficient are Slovenian public enterprises in their operation and per-
formance, what the room for cost reductions is and what the possibilities to 
Nevenka Hrovatin 
Potentials for savings in the Slovenian public  
enterprises and investments in infrastructure? 
Uprava, letnik VIII, 3/2010 8
attract private funds into infrastructure financing are. If there are potentials for 
cost savings, public enterprises could earn higher profits, which could increase 
budget income in two ways, first the government gets higher income as the 
owner and second, it collects higher taxes since public enterprises are also 
obliged to pay corporate taxes. This means that by increasing the profitability 
of public enterprises the government gets higher budget revenues acting in 
two roles: as an owner and in its fiscal function. On the other hand, lowering of 
the costs may enable the fall in prices of products and services. This will result 
in the higher disposable income of users, which will stimulate the aggregate 
demand by higher spending and will enhance the economic growth.  
The Slovenian government has been running the project on the moderni-
sation of Slovenian public administration for several years, but it does not in-
corporate the Slovenian public enterprises. The Strategy of the further devel-
opment of Slovenian public sector 2003-2005 (Government RS, 2003) men-
tions public enterprises only in one section 2.1. (Modernisation of legislation in 
the field of public services: public enterprises and public institutions), where it 
emphasises only the need to change the Law on public utilities from 1993, 
because it does not make a clear distinction between the government's role as 
an owner, manager and regulator of these entities. In the current Slovenia's 
Development Strategy 2006-2013 (Government RS, UMAR, 2005) public en-
terprises are mentioned only with regard to the governmental target to impose 
the evaluation of the biggest public sector organisations and companies in the 
majority ownership of the state with the EFQM methodology. Indirectly public 
enterprises are also linked with the following goals: to reduce the direct state 
role in the economy, to withdraw the state from the ownership of the compa-
nies and financial institutions and to diminish the role of KAD and SOD in the 
corporate governance and to introduce the public private partnerships (PPP) 
into the operation and financing of public services together with their infra-
structure investments.  
The Slovenian government has not realised its intentions to withdraw 
from the ownership of firms. Since the majority of utilities remain in the public 
ownership, it is particularly important to analyse the performance of the Slovenian 
public enterprises based on literature review and to find out what are the hidden 
reserves to increase the budget revenues, which could be especially welcome in 
the current economic crisis. This paper will also analyse if and how the invest-
ments of public enterprises and infrastructure investments have an impact on 
current budget deficit and public debt. For the definition of public enterprises we 
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will follow the legislative provision in the Transparency of Financial Relations and 
Maintenance of Separate Accounts for Different Activities Act (ZPFOLERD, 
Official Journal RS, 53/2007, Official Journal RS, 65/2008). Public enterprises 
are defined as companies in which state and municipalities exercise direct or 
indirect majority influence through the majority share in the capital or assets of 
the founder. When determining the majority of the subscribed capital or assets 
the shares of various governmental bodies are being summed up. If the result-
ing sum of shares exceeds 50%, the firm is considered to be a public enter-
prise.   
The Act extends the notion of a public enterprise to those firms where 
bodies of the state and municipalities control the majority of voting rights deriv-
ing from their ownership and to those firms where they can nominate more 
than a half members of the board of directors or supervisory boards. Finding 
which enterprises are public based on the last two criteria is more trouble-
some, so we will relay on the first criterion based on the ownership share. We 
will focus in particular on the public enterprises that operate in infrastructure 
sectors (i.e. on public utilities).  
 

2. Effectiveness and efficiency of the Slovenian 
public enterprises 

In principle the effectiveness and efficiency of the firms has been meas-
ured with their profitability and other financial measures. If public enterprises 
operated in the competitive industries, their performance should be measured 
in the same way. However, the majority of the Slovenian public enterprises 
operate in the monopoly or natural monopoly industries. If these industries are 
regulated, the regulator imposes a cap on their profitability. Therefore, the 
profitability is not an adequate indicator of their performance. The indicators 
based on their expenditures, i.e. cost efficiency should be used instead. For 
this kind of analyse in local monopoly industries benchmarking studies of cost 
efficiency proved to be useful. They compare the firms' costs by taking into 
account various factors, which may affect the cost levels. This kind of analyses 
was conducted for Slovenian Gas and electricity distribution utilities and for 
Slovenian Water supply utilities.  
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2.1  Benchmarking analysis of the cost efficiency of 
Slovenian public utilities 
Data for the cost efficiency studies for water utilities were collected for 
2004 with the assistance of the Ministry of the environment and spatial plan-
ning. 52 companies serving almost 80% of Slovenian municipalities submitted 
the data. Only 4 companies were private. Results are presented in more de-
tails in Fillipini, Hrovatin and Zoriü (2010). Slovenian water supply companies 
achieved only 84% of the cost efficiency annually in the period 1997-2003. Of 
course, there were differences among firms, as the least cost efficient were 
only 67% efficient, while the most efficient 93%. There were also significant 
differentials among the firms in the average cost per m3 of water supplied. The 
most expensive had seven times higher cost than the one with the lowest 
cost (0.2 to 1.4 euro per m3 with the average of 0.54). These differentials re-
flect different size of the firms as well as different business environment, such 
as the share of water supplied to the industry versus households, customer 
density, the share of water losses, the share of underground water and 
whether they need a heavy water treatment.  
These findings show that potentials for the increase in efficiency of the 
Slovenian water utilities approach 15% on average, which could be transferred 
to the increase in their profitability without the need to raise prices. In this way 
the municipal budgets could get higher revenues. In seven years of the study 
coverage cost savings would amount to 74 million euro. Assuming the same 
cost levels and cost efficiency in the period 2004 – 2010 the additional cost 
savings in these period would total 81 million euro. Moreover, the data indi-
cated that water pipelines are quite obsolete since the water losses repre-
sented 27% of water supplied.  
The increase in productivity of the Slovenian water supply utilities is also 
insufficient.  The standard indicator of the productivity growth is total factor 
productivity (TFP). It is calculated as the ratio of output and input index. TFP is 
often used by regulators to determine the X factor, which determines the re-
quired increase in productivity in the regulated companies in the next regula-
tory period. X normally varies among companies in the same industry due to 
differences in their achieved efficiency in the past.  
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Results of the econometric analysis with stochastic cost frontier model1 
for the TFP growth of the Slovenian utilities for the supply of drinking water 
have demonstrated that TFP growth was  0.37 % on average annually over the 
years 1997-2003. This could be compared to the results for the UK for slightly 
different period. In 1985 -1990 the TFP growth in the UK amounted to 2.3% 
annually. It then slowed down to 1.6% in 1990-1999, but was still four times 
greater than in Slovenia.  
Fillipini et al (2010) explain such differences with different regulatory set-
ting. While Slovenian companies did not face the adequate regulatory con-
straints, that would have forced them to reduce costs, the British companies 
had to follow the RPI-X formula. This price-cap method of regulation stimulated 
companies to continuous cost reductions which was possible with productivity 
increases. On the contrary, in the Slovenian companies cost reductions did not 
contribute to the increase in TFP in the period under review. Productivity in-
creases are attributable to technical change with 0.92% annual growth to-
gether with scale efficiency with 0.17% annual growth. On the other hand, 
change in output characteristics worked in the opposite direction causing 
0.76% drop in TFP annually. In the whole period 1997-2003 the TFP increased 
by 2.2%. Technical change contributed the majority of this growth with the 
5.7% growth, which should be seen as a promising finding. 
Public enterprises in Slovenia also exist in the distribution of natural gas. 
Huge potentials for cost savings have also been found in this sector. Zoriü, 
Hrovatin and Scarsi (2009) conducted an international benchmarking study on 
Slovenian, British and Dutch gas distribution utilities using nonparametric DEA 
methodology. There were 14 Slovenian, 21 British and 7 Dutch firms in the 
sample for the year 2003. When the Slovenian utilities are compared with all 
firms in the sample (using DEA based on the constant returns to scale), their 
efficiency was only 33% (table 1). However, if we use more appropriate cost 
efficiency comparisons with DEA variable returns to scale, where Slovenian 
companies are compared only with the companies of the similar size in the 
sample, Slovenian utilities operated at 48% cost efficiency, Dutch with 77% 
and British with the greatest, 97% efficiency. This in fact means that Slovenian 
gas distribution utilities could distribute the same volume of gas with 52% 
lower costs. If we assume that the cost reduction would lead to the equivalent 

1 The methodology for the econometric estimation of cost efficiency based on four models is 
presented in detail in Fillipini, Hrovatin and Zori} (2008).  
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increase in profit of their owners, private and public utilities,2 these could be 
used to finance also the infrastructure in related sectors, while the state would 
collect more corporate taxes. It is also worth mentioning that inefficiency partly 
stems from the small size of the utilities which does not allow them to exploit 
economies of scale. They reached only 80% of the efficiency from economies 
of scale (Zoriü et al, 2009, p. 121). 
 
Table 1: Average efficiency scores of the gas distribution utilities in  
              the UK, Netherlands and Slovenia calculated by DEA  
              methodology 

Efficiency scores 
Model 
UK Netherlands Slovenia Total 
DEA – CRS - average 0,777 0,731 0,326 0,604 
DEA – VRS - average 0,969 0,770 0,480 0,707 
 Note: 
CRS – constant returns to scale 
VRS – variable returns to scale 
 
Source:  Zori} et al (2009, p. 121). 



2  There were 17 companies for the distribution of gas in Slovenia, 6 in the majority ownership of 
one or more municipalities and 9 with the majority private ownership.   
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The authors explained greater inefficiency of Slovenian firms in compari-
son with foreign counterparts first with small size of the firms that prevents 
the exploitation of economies of scale and second with the inappropriate regu-
latory setting. In Slovenia the first regulatory period started only in 2006 in 
contrast to the UK, where the regulatory practice is much longer, starting with 
the privatisation of British Gas in 1986 and further developed with the separate 
regulation of gas distribution in 2002. Nevertheless, the results of the study 
should be in our view interpreted with caution. Lower cost efficiency of Slove-
nian firms may also be attributable to the wrong allocation of joint and com-
mon costs if the firms do business also in other sectors besides gas distribu-
tion. We assume that in the multiutility case the firms strived to allocate ex-
cessively high costs to the gas distribution if they could be covered from the 
end user prices. This could explain the empirical results of relatively higher 
costs of the Slovenian utilities. 
Although Slovenian gas distribution companies are on average too small, 
some of them are too large in another related business, i.e. in the district heat-
ing, which also causes high costs.  This was found by Bole and Jere (2006) for 
the gas distribution and district heating public enterprise Energetika Ljubljana, 
when they compared the firm with 178 Danish utilities in 2003. If Energetika is 
compared with the firms of similar size, it is found to be efficient. If it is com-
pared only with the companies of the similar size, it is only 89% efficient. This 
implies that if Energetika operated as efficiently as the most efficient Danish 
companies, it would use 11% less primary energy and operating expenditures. 
Inefficiency of Energetika is driven by the fact that its district heating activity is 
too large and hence operates at the decreasing returns to scale.  The exces-
sive expansion of the firm in the district heating may not have been possible 
without public ownership, which may have supported less rational investment 
behaviour. Nevertheless, if the firm had the right size, it could have saved in 
nine years one annual costs for district heating.  
Benchmarking cost efficiency analysis was repeated on behalf of the En-
ergy Agency on the sample of Slovenian gas utilities only (Hrovatin and Zoriü, 
2009a). Several models were estimated on annual data for 2006-2008. The 
most robust models proved to be MOLS (Modified Ordinary Least Squares) 
and DEA models, which vary in terms of the included variables. All of 17 utili-
ties operated with 69% of efficiency in the period. 7 of them were municipal 
public enterprises and 10 wholly or majority publicly owned. Private enter-
prises achieved higher, 72% of efficiency in contrast to public with only 66% 
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efficiency level. This implies that pubic enterprises in the Slovenian gas distri-
bution could have obtained 34% of cost savings, which would consequently 
yield higher profits and also higher budget revenues.  
Benchmarking cost efficiency analysis was also conducted for the Slove-
nian electricity distribution companies. In the first study of this kind for Slove-
nia, Fillipini, Hrovatin and  Zoriü (2004) showed that Slovenian electricity distri-
bution companies are on average 35% inefficient. The sample comprised of all 
5 electricity distribution utilities in the period 1991-2000. The authors used log-
log stochastic cost frontier function since the small data set prevented the use 
of a more appropriate translog model. They also found out that utilities are too 
small since they are operating on the increasing cost interval. Consequently 
they do not utilise cost savings associated with economies of scale. Mergers 
of utilities would be an appropriate policy recommendation, which was also 
suggested by Tajnikar et al (2002). This has been recently also envisaged by 
the Slovenian government although based on different grounds.3 
Like for the gas distribution utilities, international benchmarking cost effi-
ciency study of Slovenian firms with foreign counterparts was also done for 
the electricity distribution. DEA estimation methodology on OPEX (operating 
expenditures) data for 2003 (Netherlands 2000) was employed (Hrovatin, Zoriü, 
Scarsi, Paripovi~ and Sen~ar, 2005). The sample consisted of 33 firms, 5 
Slovenian, 11 British and 17 Dutch.  Results of all DEA models assuming con-
stant returns to scale have revealed the average 50.8% cost efficiency of all 
firms in the sample (table 2). British firms operated at the highest 58% cost 
efficiency level, followed with Dutch (50.1%) and Slovenian with only 38% 
cost efficiency. It is, however, more appropriate to compare each utility not 
with all in the sample, but only with those of the similar size. This is possible 
by estimating DEA models with variable returns to scale. Average efficiency 
level is now of course higher – 71.5%. British companies are again the most 
efficient (83.7%), followed by Dutch (67.7%) with Slovenian firms (57.7%) 
again in the last place. These findings have again indicated huge cost savings 
potentials of Slovenian firms. Lower cost efficiency of Slovenian firms versus 
the most efficient British counterparts could again be explained by the longer 
and successful regulatory tradition in the UK, which required from the utilities 
to reduce their operating costs.   

3  The reorganisation of ownership and organisational structure of electricity distribution utilities 
have been anticipated driven by the findings of the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia 
(CARS) about wrong organisational and contractual arrangements (CARS, 2009d, 2009e). For more 
on this see Hrovatin and Zori} (2010).  
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 Table 2: Efficiency scores of the electricity distribution utilities 
               in Netherlands, the UK and Slovenia 
 
Efficiency scores 
Model 
Netherlands UK Slovenia Total 
DEA – CRS - average 0,501 0,579 0,376 0,508 
DEA – VRS - average 0,677 0,837 0,577 0,715 
Notes: 
CRS – constant returns to scale 
VRS – variable returns to scale 
Source: Hrovatin et al (2005). 


Like for the gas distribution utilities the benchmarking cost efficiency 
analysis was also repeated for electricity utilities on behalf of the  Energy 
Agency on the more recent data set for 2004-2007 (Hrovatin and Zoriü (2008)). 
The authors estimated several DEA and COLS models with variable OPEX 
(operating expenditures) as an input and various specifications outputs. 4 The 
average cost efficiency of the firms in the whole period was 89%, meaning 
that companies could every year distribute the same volume of electricity with 
11% lower costs on average. This finding is of course better than in the first 
aforementioned benchmarking study for electricity distribution (Hrovatin et al, 
2005), because the comparison is done only among Slovenian utilities without 
foreign counterparts. Significant variations among firms could also be seen. 
The most efficient firm operates at the 93% efficiency level, and the least effi-
cient 11 percentage points less (i.e. 82%). If the Slovenian electricity distribu-
tion utilities had operated efficiently in 2004-2007, they could have accumu-
lated 35 million euro of cost savings, which would have been switched into 
equivalently higher profits. Taking into account the ownership structure, the 

4 COLS (Corrected Ordinary Least Squares) is an econometric method, which is based on  multi-
variate cost regression estimations using the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) technique. Estimated 
cost function with OLS regression is than shifted downward, so that the most efficient firms lie on 
the shifted fitted curve. The difference between the fitted curve and actual observations repre-
sents the cost inefficiency of the firms.  
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state could have obtained 80% of the profit (with around 80% state ownership 
share), if the whole increase in profit would be allocated to dividends.  
2.2  Labour and other operating costs and profitability 
of the Slovenian public enterprises: evidence of 
some cases 
Opportunities for profitability improvements could be found also in other 
sources, such as in operating and labour costs. An average nominal gross 
wage in electricity and gas business (distribution and supply), where the 
Slovenian gas and electricity distribution public enterprises operate, increased 
from 2000 to 2007 more than the Slovenian average wage. The increase 
amounted to 81% compared of the Slovenian average of only 60.6% as the 
table 3 shows. While in 2000 the gross wage in this sector exceeded the 
Slovenian average by 14.4%, in 2007 this gap widened to 29%. It is not diffi-
cult to see that such faster increase in wages than Slovenian average resulted 
in the lower profits than in the more reasonable and modest wage expansions. 
 
 
Table 3: Average nominal monthly gross wages in Slovenia and in the  
                electricity and gas distribution and supply in 2000-2007 and  
                their indexes 

Nominal gross 
wage/index 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Monthly nominal gross wage (in 
euro): Electricity and gas distri-
bution and supply (E) 
914.76 1,043.23 1,155.94 1,251.09 1,353.46 1,476.53 1,559.60 1,656.91 
Monthly nominal gross wage (in 
euro) : Slovenian average 
799.82 895.35 982.46 1,056.58 1,116.55 1,157.06 1,212.80 1,284.79 
Index E (previous year)  114.0 110.8 108.2 108.2 109.1 105.6 106.2 
Index Slovenian average (previ-
ous year) 
 111.9 109.7 107.5 105.7 103.6 104.8 105.9 
Index E/Slovenian average 114.4 116.5 117.7 118.4 121.2 127.6 128.6 129.0 
Index E (base year 2000) 100.0 114.0 126.4 136.8 148.0 161.4 170.5 181.1 
Index Slovenian average (base 
year 2000) 
100.0 111.9 122.8 132.1 139.6 144.7 151.6 160.6 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia 2008 (SORS, 2009). 
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Real gross wages have, of course, increased less (table 4), although they 
still demonstrate large discrepancies between the industry and the Slovenian 
average. While the average Slovenian gross increased in real terms by 16%, 
the gas and electricity distribution and supply industry faced an increase of 
almost twice as much, i.e.  31%.  

Table 4: Average real monthly gross wages in Slovenia and in the 
              electricity and gas distribution and supply in 2000-2007  
              and their indexes (base year 2007) 

Industry/index 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Monthly real gross wage (in euro): 
Electricity and gas distribution and 
supply (E) 
1,269 1,335 1,376 1,411 1,473 1,568 1,616 1,657 
Monthly real gross wage (in euro): 
Slovenian average 
1,110 1,146 1,170 1,191 1,215 1,229 1,256 1,285 
Chain index E   105 103 102 104 106 103 103 
Chain index Slovenian average  103 102 102 102 101 102 102 
Index E (base year (2000) 100 105 108 111 116 124 127 131 
Index Slovenian average  
(base year 2000) 
100 103 105 107 110 111 113 116 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia 2008 (SORS, 2009). 

It is also worth mentioning that labour costs in electricity distribution utili-
ties exceed the allowed level set by the regulator. This happens since utilities 
pay higher holiday compensations than in other public sector institutions and in 
other industries. In addition employees get the thirteenth wage, Christmas 
earnings and other benefits and rewards, which the Energy Agency of the 
Republic of Slovenia (EARS) does not consider being a part of required revenue 
and could not be calculated in the price. As a consequence utilities and their 
owners (i.e. the state as a majority owner) receive lower profits. A similar prac-
tice has been noticed in other public firms in the electricity industry. 
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Table 5: Performance indicators for the distribution activity and  
             for the firm as whole for Slovenian electricity distribution  
             utilities in 2007 
 
Company 
Elektro 
 Maribor 
Elektro  
Celje 
Elektro  
Gorenjska 
Eektro  
Ljubljana 
Elektro  
Primorska 
Activity SODO Total SODO Total SODO Total SODO Total SODO Total 
Ratio total  
revnues/ 
expenditures 
0.980 1.011 0.970 1.002 1.064 1.019 1.020 1.004 0.994 1.009 
Ratio total reve-
nues from business 
actities/ 
expenditures 
0.963 1.003 0.952 0.990 1.068 1.021 1.013 1.003 0.993 1.011 
ROA -0.35% 0.88% -0.78% 0.31% 1.51% 1.31% 0.87% 0.89% -0.16% 1.20% 
ROE  -0.53% 0.86% -0.90% 0.21% 1.29% 1.00% 0.63% 0.38% -0.20% 0.89% 
Legend: 
SODO – activities carried out by the distribution system operator 
Total – performance of the company whole taking into account all of its activities. 
ROA – return on assets 
ROE – return on equity 
Source: Elektro Gorenjska (2008), Elektro Ljubljana (2008), Elektro Primorska (2008), Elektro 
Maribor (2008) and Elektro Celje (2008). 


As the table  5 shows, it is not surprising that excessive labour costs to-
gether with other high operating and capital costs lead to low profitability of 
the utilities. The Energy Agency allowed the companies to receive 4.13% re-
turn on assets in the regulatory period 2006-2008 (EARS, 2005). Instead of 
approaching the allowed rate of return, three out five utilities operated at loss 
in 2007 in the distribution of electricity as shown in the table 5 and the two 
remaining earned significantly lower returns (1.51% and 0.87%). The perform-
ance of utilities overall (accounting for all activities) was also disappointing with 
the profitability (return on assets – ROA) between 0.31% and 1.51%. This 
clearly demonstrates underperformance and inadequate use of public assets. 
Low profitability or losses driven by stiff competition has been lately recorded 
also in the electricity supply (trade) ([epic, 2010). The key issue to be an-
swered is whether the competition among firms with the same majority owner 
that results in lower profitability of all, makes sense. An alternative model 
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would be to withdraw the supply business from the firms with the transfer of 
assets to a new founded firm for the supply of electricity. In this way wasteful 
competition among firms with the same owner would be abandoned. 
Inefficient corporate governance of public assets was found out and criti-
cised also by CARS. On the basis of public audit for the period 2005-2007 
CARS warned the public enterprise for the construction and renewal of high-
ways DARS for its inefficient and ineffective maintenance of highways (CARS, 
2010).5 The main findings are:  

1.  DARS does not have a strategy for the highways maintenance that 
would be harmonised with the Resolution on the national programme 
for the construction of highways in Slovenia.  
2.  It receives compensation for conducting public procurements which is 
based on the value of works done. It does not have an incentive to se-
lect the lowest bidder, since it receives greater compensation from the 
greater value of works. Also if the value of works done is lower, it re-
ceives a variable reward for this achievement.  
3.  It has not done any long-run analysis and maintenance plans which 
would enable to compare what is more cost effective: higher cost of 
regular maintenance in conjunction with lower investment mainte-
nance costs afterwards or the other way around. 
4.  DARS does not have any international comparisons of maintenance 
costs associated with the use of alternative construction materials in 
the construction of highways. 
5.  Maintenance costs per km of highways have been increasing more rap-
idly than the length of the constructed highways in total. 
6.  DARS has managed to accomplish only between 19% to 31% of regu-
lar maintenance work (filling the gaps), which may lately bring about 
higher costs of investment maintenance. 
7.  DARS has outsourced the preparation of professional and technical 
background for conducting public procurement procedures to the com-
pany DDC, consulting and engineering, on the contractual basis. The 
conflict of interest could clearly be seen as DDC is paid according to 
the value of the planned investment works rather than to its actual 
work done based on the working hours. To maximise its earnings it is 
interested to plan high amount of investments works and their values.  

5 The CARS has also pointed out the inappropriateness of the concession contract and other short-
comings and faults in the construction of highways. For more information on this see Hrovatin 
(2010).  
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In conclusion, the entire system of regular and investment maintenance 
of highways in DARS is organised in such way that it enhances higher use of 
public resources and lower efficiency on behalf of the higher profitability of 
public enterprises DARS and DCC. The inefficiencies were not revealed only in 
the maintenance of highways but according to the audit reports of CARS also 
in the maintenance of municipalities' roads in some Slovenian municipalities. 
The CARS has also highlighted the inefficient use of budget sources in the 
obligatory local public service of managing the public green areas and parks 
(CARS, 2009c). In 2007 municipalities have not established a procedure ena-
bling efficient use of public funds. Municipalities define only the value of 
needed resources without prescribing how the resources should be used and 
what the required quality is. Due to the lack of prescribed targets, the use of 
funds was left to the firms managing the green areas without any control on 
how efficiently and effectively the funds were spent. 
 

3. Public support for the renewable energy 
sources 
 
Public support schemes for the development of renewable energy 
sources and combined heat and power with high exploitation also represent 
potentials for savings in both, public and private firms. Slovenian government 
supports the generation of electricity with feed-in-tariffs in conjunction with the 
compulsory purchase of electricity in small power plants of up to 5 MW and 
with financial contributions to cover operating expenses for other units. (En-
ergy Act-C, 2008). Support systems should be in place as the electricity from 
renewables and co-generation of heat and power with high exploitation is 
more costly than electricity from conventional sources. Without supporting 
schemes these power plants could not compete in the market. Government 
thus provides supports to the firms to fill in the gap between higher generation 
costs and lower market prices. Funds for the feed-in-tariffs have been col-
lected by a special centre for supports within the power exchange Borzen. 
They are incorporated into the use of network charges as a compulsory contri-
bution of all electricity consumers. It is estimated that every year around 45 
million euro of support funds will be collected (Hrovatin and Zoriü, 2009b; Zoriü 
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and Hrovatin, 2010). The majority of 599 recipients of feed-in-tariffs and contri-
butions in 2008 were small hydropower plants and solar power plants.  
Compulsory collection of funds could be partly replaced by direct pay-
ments of electricity consumers for green energy. This would in turn make pos-
sible to use compulsory payments incorporated in the use of network charges 
as additional excise duties on electricity for reducing the budget deficit.6 How 
many compulsory collected funds could be replaced with the consumers’ vol-
untary contributions of course depends on the willingness to pay of Slovenian 
households for green electricity. Of course, it would be more desirable not to 
use the compulsory contributions from use of network charges to increase 
excise duties, but to use both compulsory and voluntary collected payments 
for stimulating the investments into the use of renewable energy sources. In 
fact, investments into these and related business would in the long-run from 
the supply side increase the budget revenues (through profits and taxes). 
Therefore, shifting the compulsory contributions into excise duties on electric-
ity could be only used temporarily in times of crisis to help the state budget to 
recover.  
The study on the willingness to pay for green electricity conducted by Zo-
ri} and Hrovatin (2010) for 2008 using the sample of 450 Slovenian households 
has revealed that 77% of the households are willing to pay on average 4.2 
euro monthly, which represents 10.5% of the monthly electricity bill. If only 
those households that are willing to pay are taken into account, the monthly 
payment is even higher (5.4 euro monthly). 745.000 households (data for 2007) 
would be willing to pay 37.5 million together for green electricity. Actual pay-
ments would most likely be lower, as the stated preferences may exaggerate 
the real willingness to pay. On the other hand, higher payments could be realised 
with the right marketing and policy actions targeted to the households with 
higher education, incomes and environmental awareness. The econometric 
estimations have proven that these households are more willing to pay for 
green electricity. Creating appropriate marketing strategies in the firms and 
better information campaigns in the relevant state authorities would trigger the 
achievement of these goals.    
    


6  Excise duties are a controversial issue. On the one hand they raise budget revenues, while on 
the other they hinder the competitiveness of the firm. Discussion on this issue would go beyond 
the aim of this paper. 
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4. Public-private partnerships in infrastructure  
investments as a mean to reduce public  
financing 

Raising credits by public enterprises for infrastructure investments does 
not increase the official public debt and does not impose a burden on the cur-
rent budget. It is just the opposite when the state or municipalities raise cred-
its by themselves to finance investments in infrastructure. The state guaran-
tees are also not included in the public debt. However, they represent a poten-
tial threat for public financing, as they are transferred into the public debt when 
the creditor claims guarantees for debt repayment. Although public enterprises 
in their credit activities normally do not cause the increase in public debt, the 
recent tendencies of increasing public ownership in Slovenia and the absence 
to exploit opportunities offered by public-private partnerships in infrastructure 
financing should be in our view of great concern.  
Before the crisis Slovenia did not use the opportunity to attract private fi-
nancing into infrastructure projects through various forms of public-private 
partnerships (PPP). 7 Slovenia participates with only 0.1% in all European PPPs, 
whose value is almost negligible (EIB, 2007). Together with Denmark, Latvia, 
an Slovak republic it is placed last regarding the development of PPPs. PPPs 
are the most represented in the UK with the 56% share by value, followed by 
Spain, France, Germany and Italy with a total share of one third of PPPs by 
value (EIB, 2007).  
In the ownership structure of public enterprises the Slovenian state went 
backward when passing the PPP Act (2006). This Act provides an incentive to 
public enterprises (with mixed ownership), who run their activities by conces-
sions, to withdraw the private shares from the companies. If they do so and 

7   The rationale for underrepresentation of PPPs in Slovenia have been analysed in more detail by 
Hrovatin (2010). The key reasons are:  
- late adoption of legislation and delays in its implementation in practice,  
- reliance on the public financing of the highways and railways construction which was 
possible because of low indebtedness of the state and thus compliance to the Maas-
tricht's fiscal criteria without problems,  
- the pattern of ownership transformation of companies in transition leading to the major-
ity of public utilities being organised as public enterprises,  
- the recent reorganisation of public enterprises as required by the Public Private Partner-
ships Act (2006), enhancing the ownership share of the state and municipalities,  
- failures that happened in conducting the first PPPs in Slovenia (the case of water treat-
ment in Maribor).  

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end up as a 100% publicly owned, they could continue with their businesses 
without getting the concession through public procurement procedure. On the 
contrary, if they keep private ownership shares, they have to compete for the 
concession in public procurement with other rivals. In addition, an increased 
influence of the municipalities was enacted in 2010 with the provision that 
infrastructure belongs to the municipalities. Municipalities could lease the in-
frastructure to public enterprises. The rent should cover at least depreciation of 
the assets. If the rent is agreed on such a minimum level, it is clear that the 
financial resources do not suffice for new investments. In the previous regime 
the infrastructure could be recorded in the sub-balance sheets of the public 
enterprises as the »assets in management«, meaning that municipalities were 
indirect owners of the assets. Public enterprises had more business freedom 
to efficiently manage the infrastructure than in the new regime. 
With these increase of »public« Slovenia has also launched more oppor-
tunities to increase public financing and hence public debt. Although the in-
debtednesses of municipalities in 2007 represented only 2.6% of public debt 
(CARS, 2009a), the debt of municipalities tends to increase. Only in two years, 
from 2007 to 2009, the gross indebtedness of the municipalities increased 
almost five times, and their net indebtedness 6.6 times as table 6 shows. 

Table 6:   Borrowing of Slovenian municipalities in 2007 - 2009 in euro 

  2007 2008 2009 
index  
2009/2007 
Borrowing 41.603.813 126.322.007 198.991.158 478,3 
Amortization of debt 17.435.737 23.377.435 38.202.260 219,1 
Net borrowing 24.168.076 102.944.572 160.788.898 665,3 
Source: MF (2010b).  

The accumulated budget deficit of municipalities in 2007 was negligible (-0.1 
GDP), but in 2008 it considerably increased to 0.6% of GDP and remained around 
this level (0.5% of GDP) also in 2009 (MF and SORS, 2010). 
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The majority of municipalities’ loans are raised for the construction of 
schools, kindergartens, and sport halls, followed by loans for the construction 
of communal infrastructure (water pipelines and sewerage, waste water 
treatment plants). Municipalities face constraints in their credit financing. They 
can only borrow if the debt servicing and obligations imposed by given guaran-
tees do not exceed 8% of municipalities' revenues in the previous year from 
which donations and transfer payments for investments from the state budget, 
payments from the EU budget and revenues of the municipal public utility 
plants (in Slovene »režijski obrat«) are deducted. Public private partnerships 
which would remove a burden of infrastructure financing from municipal budg-
ets would be in particular welcome at the municipal level. Unfortunately, this 
instrument is underdeveloped in Slovenian municipalities as the evidence wit-
nessed. 77 of the Slovenian municipalities or more than one third (36.4 %) has 
not signed any PPP contract. This is 8 more than in 2008. Only one contract 
was concluded in 49 municipalities. Average number of contracts per munici-
pality is 1.95 or, if we take into account only those municipalities, which have 
signed contracts, 3.09. The largest number of singed contract in a municipality 
is 14 (Financing of municipalities and accountable governance of municipalities' 
property, 2010).  
The current economic and financial crisis has severely challenged also 
PPP type of infrastructure financing, which forced municipalities to find alterna-
tive revenues. In the UK, for example, municipalities are trying to find addi-
tional budget revenues in local betterment taxes. Planning gain is paid by de-
velopers of new dwellings who received higher profits (gains) as a result of the 
change of the purpose of the land use. Another possibility is also collection of 
compulsory contribution from the constructor (planning obligation) for the con-
struction of communal infrastructure in new developments and associated 
social infrastructure (new schools, kindergartens, health centres, etc.) (Bailey, 
2010).  
On the state level state loans and state guarantees for the infrastructure 
construction seem to be more tricky because of its larger size. Although in 
Europe the most PPPs have been in the transport sector (60% by number and 
84% by value) with highways in the first place, Slovenia did not succeed to 
take advantage of private sector participation in the construction of highways. 
The entire Slovenian highway cross has been constructed with public funds by 
the public enterprise DARS. The state has been granting guarantees to DARS 
for its loans. It is not surprising that these guarantees represented the largest 
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share in all state guarantees in the period 2000 – 2009 (MF, 2010a). State 
guarantees have escalated from 1.206 million euro in 2001 to  4.957 million 
euro in 2009 or from 5.8% of GDP in 2001 to 12.7% of GDP in 2008 and finally 
to 20,5% of GDP in  2010. 8 
CARS has pointed out several deficiencies in highway construction: delays 
in construction, nonfulfilment of planed construction works by the deadline, 
exceeding planned investment resources, inappropriate concession arrange-
ments and allocation of responsibilities among the state, DARS and the firms 
for the state roads. Further threats in the financing of the highway construction 
programme are envisaged in the need for raising additional loans and in the 
problems in servicing already raised loans. The anticipations of CARS, that 
financing of highway construction may last longer than planned (by 2033) so 
that its completion may be postponed to 2050 come as no surprise (CARS, 
2009b and Hrovatin, 2010). 
Unlike the construction of highways, the state has not seriously ques-
tioned the need for the modernisation of Slovenian railways. Until 2007 only 
one fourth of the planned modernisation programme that should be completed 
by that time had in fact been realised. The state had also been giving guaran-
tees to railways in the past and took over some loans which increased the 
state capital in the firm. Also, some financial assistance was given for solving 
redundancies and human resource restructuring. If this practice continues in 
the future, the budget expenditures would increase which would in turn raise 
state borrowing. The governmental will to prepare the revitalisation and mod-
ernisation of railways having private participation in mind seems promising to 
hinder the past practice. 
The current size of state guarantees will also expand due to the envisaged 
guarantees for the construction of new lignite-fired thermal power plant in 
[o{tanj (TE[ 6). If the public financing may to some extent may be justified in 
highway construction, it is much more difficult to accept this way of financing 
in the energy sector. The electricity industry has faced tremendous transfor-
mation under the EU liberalisation legislation and practice. In particular in the 
generation private initiative should lead the investment decisions and their 
financing. Some countries, like Finland, even went so far that the construction 
of two new nuclear power plant has not been entrusted to a public enterprise, 
but to two private non-profit consortia instead (Gatermann, 2010).  

8 Considerable raise of guarantees in 2010 is mostly attributable to the guarantees of the state to 
help solving the financial crisis and was caused by infrastructure investments.  
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5. Management of public enterprises  

Efficient management of public enterprises is a prerequisite for significant 
cost savings and thus their better performance. The theoretical model of 
Schleifer and Vishny (1994) has demonstrated that public enterprises employ 
too many workers and gets reward transfers from the budget if the state exer-
cises political influence through the majority ownership in the firms. Managers 
in public enterprises subordinate to the will of the politicians in order to keep 
their managerial positions. Hence, they will fulfil politicians’ requirements to 
reward the loyalty of political parties’ colleagues with hiring them for posts in 
public enterprises. Redek (2008) upgraded the basic Scheifer - Vishny’s model 
with the assumption, that politicians are constrained in their attempts of pro-
viding jobs with the fear of scandal due to the media revelations about their 
wrong practices. In addition, inexperienced staff raises costs of the public en-
terprises due to the lack of knowledge and skills. In this way, media in their 
information role about the politicians’ behaviour, act as a control mechanism 
against the tendency of overstaffing in public enterprises and against inade-
quate labour qualifications. 
To prevent a negative influence of politicians on the appointment of un-
qualified managers based on their political affiliation, an efficient selection 
mechanism should be established. Slovenia attempted to launch such a 
mechanism for the appointment of the supervisory board members with the 
foundation of human resource accreditation committee. Since this was done 
only for supervisory boards, the main criterion for the top managerial posts 
remains to be political affiliation and loyalty together with good connections 
with political elite.  
Efficient managerial leadership and performance could also be stimulated 
with adequate remuneration system. The fundamental rule should be that 
managers in public enterprises receive equal payments as managers in the 
private companies with similar risk. Such remuneration schemes are recom-
mended also by the United Nations (2005). If public enterprises enjoy monop-
oly status and bear lower risks, their managers should earn lower wages and 
other payments. It is also recommended that managers' payments should 
consist of a fixed and a variable part. The variable part should be tied to the 
achievement of predefined targets. If public enterprises do business in non-
competitive markets, the predefined target could not be the earned profit 
alone, but other goals such as cost reductions, higher quality of products and 
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services, success in reorganisation of business processes and in restructuring 
and the like. The focus, thus, should be on the specification of predetermined 
results (targets) and on the measurement of their implementation, which as a 
consequence determines managers' level of remuneration. Performance con-
tracts between the state as the principal and the public enterprise as an agent 
have been successfully implemented in OECD countries  and in some develop-
ing countries (India, Korea) (United Nations, 2005 and Chaterjee, 2010). In 
these contracts the targets (expected results) are defined in detail. This sys-
tem also allows calculating the efficiency and/or effectiveness of public enter-
prises' performance which further enables their ranking and hence serves as a 
foundation for determining the top managers' remunerations.  
From this perspective the Slovenian managerial remuneration system, 
where the managers' remuneration is tied to the average wage in each public 
enterprise, seems to be wrong. It gives managers in the industries with higher 
average wages higher remunerations no matter if the companies perform 
worse and do not reach the results. Slovenia, thus, needs both: first perform-
ance contracts between the state and public enterprises about the specified 
targets and second, top management remunerations tied to the achievement 
of these targets.  

6. Conclusions 

Analysis of potential savings of the Slovenian public enterprises has re-
vealed significant abilities for cost reductions and consequently for the in-
crease in their profitability. This would raise revenues of their owners – the 
state and municipalities directly as a share in increased profit and by collecting 
higher corporate taxes. Benchmarking analysis of the gas and electricity distri-
bution firms as well as water supply utilities have indicated potentials of  34 %, 
11 % and 16 % average annual cost reductions annually, if Slovenian firms are 
compared only among themselves. In the comparisons with foreign firms, 
even larger savings could be achieved.  A part of their inefficiency is associated 
with the fact that they are too small. With the mergers of firms without any 
additional efforts some cost savings could be accomplished. 
As the studies took into account only operating costs, real costs savings 
would be even greater if the costs of capital are also incorporated. Among 
operating costs labour costs also proved to be too high. The CARS has also 
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pointed out several inefficiencies in the construction and maintenance of 
highways and roads and in the management of green public areas. 
Additional budget sources could also indirectly be collected from users of 
public services by using their willingness to pay for certain products and ser-
vices (i.e. green electricity). Further reduction in public spending is also possi-
ble with the greater use of PPPs for infrastructure financing. Slovenia has 
achieved very limited results in this area. Nevertheless, potential savings could 
not be realised without the efficient management of public enterprises. To 
pursue this key target Slovenia should introduce at least two reforms. First, the 
performance contracts between the state and public enterprises about the 
targets should be established and second, the appropriate recruitment and 
remuneration schemes for public sector managers should be designed, where 
the managerial remuneration would be tied to the accomplishment of prede-
fined targets.  



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POVZETEK 
KAKO PRIVAR^EVATI JAVNA SREDSTVA V  
SLOVENSKIH JAVNIH PODJETJIH IN PRI  
INVESTICIJAH V INFRASTRUKTURO? 

Namen ~lanka je analizirati, kako uspe{na in u~inkovita so slovenska 
javna podjetja pri izvajanju svojih dejavnosti, kak{ne so možnosti za pri-
hranke in za pritegnitev tudi zasebnih sredstev v infrastrukturne investici-
je. ^e obstajajo rezerve za znižanje stro{kov, lahko javna podjetja dosega-
jo ve~ji dobi~ek, iz katerega lahko država prvi~, prejema dividende kot 
prora~unski prihodek in drugi~, prejema vi{je davke, saj tudi javna podjet-
ja pla~ujejo davek na dobi~ek. Država lahko torej s pove~anjem donosnos-
ti javnih podjetij prejme ve~ji prora~unski kola~ v dveh vlogah, v vlogi 
lastnika in v fiskalni vlogi. Po drugi strani nižji stro{ki javnih podjetij omo-
go~ajo zniževanje cen proizvodov in storitev, kar lahko na povpra{evalni 
strani deluje spodbujevalno, saj potro{nikom ostaja vi{ji nerazdeljeni 
dohodek, kar vzpodbuja ve~je agregatno povpra{evanje in s tem gospo-
darsko rast. Analiza možnih prihrankov temelji na pregledu znanstvenih 
objav o u~inkovitosti in uspe{nosti slovenskih javnih podjetij in na analizi 
ugotovitev pristojnih organov za njihov nadzor (Ra~unskega sodi{~a). 
Za slovenska komunalna podjetja (oskrba z vodo) ter plinska in elektro-
distribucijska podjetja so bile izdelane ben~marking analize stro{kovne 
u~inkovitosti, ki primerjajo bodisi samo doma~a podjetja med sabo, bodisi 
doma~a podjetja s tujimi v isti panogi z uporabo razli~nih modelov. Anali-
za možnih prihrankov je pokazala na precej{nje rezerve za zniževanja 
stro{kov in za posledi~no pove~anje njihove donosnosti. S tem bi se 
pove~ali tudi prihodki njihovih lastnikov – države in ob~in in sicer nepos-
redno v obliki udeležbe v dobi~ku in z davkom na dohodek podjetij. Pri-
merjalne ben~marking analize plinskih in elektrodistribucijskih podjetjih 
ter podjetij za oskrbo z vodo so pokazale na možnost 34% (plinska), 11% 
(elektrodistribucijska)  oziroma 16% (podjetja za oskrbo z vodo) znižanja 
stro{kov povpre~no letno, ~e primerjamo samo doma~a podjetja. ^e jih 
primerjamo s tujimi podjetji, pa so možni prihranki {e ve~ji. Del te 
neu~inkovitosti gre prepisati tudi premajhni velikosti podjetij. Že samo z 
združevanjem podjetij bi lahko realizirali dolo~ene stro{kovne prihranke. 
^e upo{tevamo, da so analize zajele samo teko~e stro{ke poslovanja, ne 
pa tudi stro{kov kapitala, bi bili dejanski prihranki ob upo{tevanju vseh 
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stro{kov lahko {e ve~ji. Njihovo u~inkovitost bi bilo mogo~e pove~ati tudi 
z vpeljavo ustrezne regulacije (na primer za podjetja za oskrbo z vodo) 
oziroma s pridobivanjem izku{enj in znanja regulatorja. Britanski primer 
plinskih podjetij namre~ kaže, da ustaljena, izdelana in dalj{a regulatorna 
praksa omogo~a bolj u~inkovito regulacijo, ki se posledi~no kaže v ve~ji 
u~inkovitosti podjetij. Analizirana podjetja imajo tudi previsoke stro{ke 
dela, saj so se le-ti (na primer v dejavnosti oskrbe z elektriko in plinom) 
pove~evali hitreje od slovenskega povpre~ja. Poleg tega pa stro{ki dela  
zajemajo tudi del stro{kov, ki jih regulator ne priznava kot upravi~ene in 
zato znižujejo donos podjetij.  Na {tevilne pomanjkljivosti, katerih odprava 
bi zagotovo povzro~ila zniževanje stro{kov, je pri vzdrževanju in gradnji 
avtocest ter cest in  urejanju javnih povr{in opozorilo tudi Ra~unsko 
sodi{~e. Celoten sistem rednega in investicijskega vzdrževanja avtocest v 
družbi DARS je organiziran tako, da vzpodbuja vi{jo porabo javnih sred-
stev in s tem nižjo u~inkovitost na ra~un doseganja vi{je donosnosti pos-
lovanja družbe v državni lasti DARS in družbe DCC. Ra~unsko sodi{~e je 
opozorilo tudi na pomanjkljivosti vzdrževanja ob~inskih cest v nekaterih 
slovenskih ob~inah in na neu~inkovitost porabe prora~unskih sredstev pri 
izvajanju obvezne ob~inske gospodarske javne službe urejanja javnih 
zelenih povr{in na podlagi analize za leto 2007. Ker ob~ine dolo~ijo le 
obseg sredstev, ne pa tudi, kako naj se sredstva porabijo in kak{na je zah-
tevana kakovost, je poraba sredstev prepu{~ena izvajalcem, nad katerimi 
ni vzpostavljenega ustreznega nadzora.   
Možni dodatni viri za prora~unske prihodke so tudi v izkori{~anju prip-
ravljenosti uporabnikov za pla~ilo dolo~enih proizvodov in storitev (na 
primer za zeleno energijo). Slovenska država nudi podpore za soproizvod-
njo elektrike in toplote z visokim izkoristkom, ki jih zbere iz obveznega 
prispevka v omrežnini, katerega zavezanci za pla~ilo so vsi uporabniki 
elektri~ne energije. Tak{no zbiranje sredstev bi bilo deloma mogo~e 
nadomestiti z neposrednimi prispevki uporabnikov za zeleno energijo, 
sredstva podpor, ki se zbirajo preko cene za uporabo omrežij, pa bi lahko 
preusmerili v tro{arine za polnjenje prora~unske luknje 
Koliko teh sredstev bi lahko nadomestili s prispevki uporabnikov, je 
seveda odvisno od pripravljenosti slovenskih gospodinjstev za pla~ilo 
zelene energije. Raziskava Zoriü in Hrovatin o pripravljenosti na pla~ilo za 
zeleno energijo iz leta 2008 je na vzorcu 450 slovenskih gospodinjstev 
ocenila, da je kar 77% anketiranih gospodinjstev pripravljeno pla~ati za 
zeleno energijo in sicer v povpre~ju 4,2 evra mese~no, kar predstavlja 
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10,5% mese~nega ra~una za elektriko. ^e pa pri izra~unu mese~nega zne-
ska upo{tevamo samo tiste, ki so pripravljeni pla~ati za zeleno energijo, 
pa se znesek povzpne na 5,4 evra. ^e upo{tevamo, da smo leta 2007 imeli 
745.000 gospodinjstev, bi le-ta bila letno pripravljena pla~ati okrog 37,5 
milijona evra za zeleno energijo. Seveda je potrebno pri tem upo{tevati, 
da bi bil ta znesek v resnici nižji, saj je dejanska pripravljenost za pla~ilo 
praviloma nižja od hipoteti~ne. Po drugi strani pa bi bilo mogo~e priprav-
ljenost za pla~ilo bolj izobraženih gospodinjstev ter tistih z vi{jim dohod-
kom in bolj ekolo{ko osve{~enih tudi pove~ati, saj je ekonometri~na anali-
za v omenjeni raziskavi pokazala, da so tak{na gospodinjstva bolj nagnje-
na k pla~ilu za zeleno energijo. Na to bi lahko vplivali z ustreznimi trženj-
skimi strategijami podjetij pa tudi z ve~jim ozave{~anjem državljanov s 
strani ustreznih državnih institucij. 
Seveda bi bilo {e ugodneje, ~e ne bi ve~ali tro{arin, temve~ bi 
pove~ali sredstva za vzpodbujanje teh investicij, saj bi to tudi preko zago-
na povezanih dejavnosti v dalj{em obdobju prispevalo k pove~anju pro-
ra~unskih prihodkov (preko davkov in dobi~kov). Zaradi vsega povedane-
ga je treba preusmeritev obveznih podpor zbranih preko omrežnin razu-
meti kot za~asen in omejen ukrep v ~asu krize kot pomo~ državnemu pro-
ra~unu, da si ~im hitreje opomore.  
Razbremenitev ob~inskih prora~unov in državnih garancij pa bi bilo 
mogo~e dose~i tudi z ve~jo pritegnitvijo zasebnega kapitala v financiranje 
infrastrukturnih investicij. Slovenija je to možnost doslej izkori{~ala v zelo 
omejenem obsegu.  V vseh evropskih projektih javno-zasebnega partnerstva 
(JZP) je udeležena le z 0,1% in se skupaj z Dansko, Latvijo in Slova{ko  
uvr{~a na dno lestvice držav po razvitosti JZP. Na podlagi zakonodajnih 
sprememb se v Sloveniji tudi pove~uje obseg in vloga javne lastnine in to 
{e zlasti na ob~inski ravni.  Podatki o zadolževanju ob~in kažejo, da je dolg 
ob~in leta 2007 obsegal le 2,6% javnega dolga, vendar le-ta nara{~a. V 
letih 2007 – 2009 se je bruto zadolžitev ob~in pove~ala skoraj za petkrat, 
neto zadolžitev pa za 6,6 krat. Na prvem mestu se ob~ine zadolžujejo za 
izgradnjo {ol, vrtcev in {portnih dvoran, na drugem mestu pa za izgradnjo 
komunalne infrastrukture (vodovod, kanalizacija, ~istilne naprave), kjer bi 
lahko v ve~ji meri izkoristile možnosti, ki jih nudi javno-zasebno partnerstvo. 
O podrazvitosti instrumenta pritegnitve zasebnega kapitala in prora~unske 
razbremenitve zgovorno pri~a dejstvo, da kar 77 ob~in (36,4%) nima sklen-
jene nobene pogodbe o javno-zasebnem partnerstvu, kar je 8 ve~ kot v 
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letu 2008. Eno pogodbo ima 49 ob~in, povpre~je na ob~ino pa je 1,95, 
oziroma, ~e upo{tevamo samo ob~ine, ki imajo sklenjene pogodbe, 3,09. 
Na državni ravni je zadolževanje države in dajanje poro{tev za infras-
trukturne investicije bolj problemati~no kot na ob~inski zaradi ve~jega 
obsega. V Evropi je bilo najve~ JZP (60% po {tevilu in 84% po vrednosti) v 
prometu, kjer prevladujejo avtocestni projekti (EIB, 2007). Slovenija mož-
nosti udeležbe zasebnih partnerjev ni izkoristila in je avtocestni križ v celo-
ti gradila z javnimi sredstvi ter dajala poro{tva za najetje kreditov javnemu 
podjetju DARS. Prav ta zajemajo najve~ji delež v strukturi poro{tev slo-
venske države v obdobju 2000-2009 (MF, 2010a), ki so se od 2001 do 2009 
pove~ala od 1,206 milijonov evrov na 4,957 mio evrov, oziroma od 5,8% 
BDP na 12,7% BDP leta 2008 in na 20,5% leta 2010.9  
Ra~unsko sodi{~e je opozorilo na zamude pri izgradnji in nedoseganje 
planirane gradnje v predvidenih ~asovnih rokih ter na prekora~itve plani-
ranih investicijskih sredstev kot tudi na neustrezno ureditev koncesijskega 
razmerja in delitve pristojnosti med državo, DARS in družbami za državne 
ceste. Nevarnosti, ki se napovedujejo pri financiranju avtocestnega pro-
grama so tudi v nadaljnjem zadolževanju in problemih s servisiranjem 
dolga, zato niso presenetljive ocene Ra~unskega sodi{~a, da bo financira-
nje izgradnje avtocest trajala dlje od predvidene (2033) in da bo dejansko 
dokon~anje financiranja odmaknjeno na konec sredine tega stoletja (2050) 
(RSRS, 2009b in Hrovatin, 2010). 
Na državni ravni je zadolževanje države in dajanje poro{tev za infras-
trukturne investicije bolj problemati~no kot  na ob~inski zaradi ve~jega 
obsega. ^eprav se državna poro{tva formalno ne {tejejo v javni dolg, 
predstavljajo potencialno možnost, da se prelijejo v javni dolg, ~e se 
poro{tva unov~ijo. V Evropi je bilo najve~ JZP (60% po {tevilu in 84% po 
vrednosti) v prometu, kjer prevladujejo avtocestni projekti. Slovenija 
možnosti udeležbe zasebnih partnerjev ni izkoristila in je avtocestni križ v 
celoti gradila z javnimi sredstvi ter dajala poro{tva za najetje kreditov jav-
nemu podjetju DARS. Prav ta zajemajo najve~ji delež v strukturi poro{tev 
slovenske države v obdobju 2000-2009, ki so se od 2001 do 2009 pove~ala 
od 1,206 milijonov evrov na 4,957 mio evrov, oziroma od 5,8% BDP na 
12,7% BDP leta 2008 in na 20,5% leta 2010.  
 

9  Veliko pove~anje poro{tev leta 2010 izvira predvsem iz poro{tev iz naslova re{evanja finan~ne 
krize in ni povezano z infrastrukturnimi investicijami. 
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Ra~unsko sodi{~e je opozorilo na zamude pri izgradnji in nedoseganje 
planirane gradnje v predvidenih ~asovnih rokih ter na prekora~itve plani-
ranih investicijskih sredstev kot tudi na neustrezno ureditev koncesijskega 
razmerja in delitve pristojnosti med državo, DARS in družbami za državne 
ceste. Nevarnosti, ki se napovedujejo pri financiranju avtocestnega pro-
grama, so tudi v nadaljnjem zadolževanju in problemih s servisiranjem 
dolga, zato niso presenetljive ocene Ra~unskega sodi{~a, da bo financira-
nje izgradnje avtocest trajalo dlje od predvidene (leto 2033) in da bo 
dejansko dokon~anje financiranja odmaknjeno na konec sredine tega sto-
letja (do 2050). 
Ugotovljenih možnih prihrankov slovenskih podjetij ni mogo~e dose~i 
brez u~inkovitega upravljanja javnih podjetij. Da bi to dosegli, bi v Slove-
niji morali uvesti vsaj dve reformi: prvi~, uvesti sistem pogodb med drža-
vo in javnimi podjetji o doseganju vnaprej dolo~enih ciljev javnih podjetij 
in drugi~, vzpostaviti politi~no neodvisen sistem kadrovanja menedžerjev 
na podlagi strokovnih referenc ter sistem nagrajevanja menedžerjev, 
vezan na rezultate poslovanja javnih podjetij oziroma na preverjanje 
doseganja vnaprej postavljenih pogodbenih ciljev med državo in javnim 
podjetjem.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
